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Abstract 
Recent studies find that idiosyncratic risk (IR), the degree to which firm specific returns are more 
volatile than aggregate market returns, has increased since the 1960’s and attribute this to economy 
wide factors such as the role of the IT revolution. To gain further insights into why IR has increased 
over time, our paper uses industry level data and firm level data to study if firms and industries that 
are more R&D intensive are characterized by higher IR due to how the process of innovation affects 
the uncertainty of expected future profits.  While the industry level results prove inconclusive, the 
firm level results are encouraging: a clear relationship is found between a firm’s R&D intensity and 
the volatility of its returns.   
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I.  Introduction 
The paper studies whether idiosyncratic risk— the degree to which firm and industry specific 
returns are more volatile than aggregate market returns— is higher in innovative industries and 
firms which are characterized by greater uncertainty regarding their expected future profits.  The 
central idea is that since innovation is a process characterized by uncertainty (in the Knightian 
sense, hence beyond just the risk of a lottery), and since asset pricing is a function of the stochastic 
discount factor which incorporates firm level risk, the behavior of returns of innovative firms and 
industries should be higher than that of non-innovative firms and industries.  Are they? 
The study is motivated by the fact that most finance studies of stock price volatility do not look 
at innovation characteristics of the firms or industries in question.  When innovation is considered it 
is referred to in more general terms, such as the potential effect of the IT revolution or the New 
Economy on firm conduct and performance. For example, Shiller finds that excess volatility, i.e. the 
degree to which stock prices are more volatile than the underlying fundamentals, is much higher 
during periods of technological revolutions when animal spirits, herd behavior and ‘bandwagon 
effects’ (on the part of investors) are strong (Shiller 2001).  And Campbell et al (2005) find that 
idiosyncratic risk has increased at the firm level since the 1960’s and attribute this to various factors 
including the effect of the IT revolution on (a) the speed at which investors receive new information, 
and on (b) the speed at which new firms can go public (earlier than before). But here again, the 
effect of innovation (at neither the macro nor micro level) is not actually measured.  
The paper studies whether the variance of stock returns is in fact higher for industries and 
firms which have higher R&D intensity (in comparison to the general market).  The logic is that since 
a firm’s investment in innovation creates both high expectations for its future growth as well as fears 
that the investment will lead to a ‘dry hole’, those firms and industries which invest more in 
innovation should in theory be characterized by more uncertainty and hence more volatility of their 
returns.  Furthermore, as innovation tends to be more radical in the early phase of industry evolution 
where there is a large presence of small firms rather than the more mature phase where firms are 
larger and more concerned with incremental process innovation (Gort and Klepper 1982), we ask 
whether stock price volatility in younger industries, such as biotechnology, is higher than in older 
industries such as textiles.   In order to be precise from the start with our terms, the exact 
relationship we are testing for is that between innovation (R&D intensity) and volatility of returns, 
where the latter is measured in relation to the volatility of aggregate market returns. We focus on a 
relative measure of volatility: the ratio between the variance of firm specific returns and the returns 
of the general market, as we think this is a good proxy for idiosyncratic risk.    
 The analysis in the paper finds that at the industry level, it is not possible to say that more 
innovative industries have higher idiosyncratic risk (from now on denoted by IR).  That is, ranking 
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industries by their R&D intensity (at the high end industries like aerospace and pharma, and at the 
low end industries like textiles and construction) does not predict their ranking in terms of IR.  At the 
firm level, instead, it is found that those firms that have higher R&D intensity are in fact the ones 
with highest IR.  We hypothesize that this is because high R&D spending by firms indicates to 
market analysts the high growth potential of these firms, however these expectations are not always 
met since investment in innovation has uncertain outcomes.  Interestingly, however, we find that this 
result does not hold more strongly for firms in highly innovative industries. In fact, it holds strongest 
for firms in new innovative sectors like Biotech and in old non innovative sectors like textiles, more 
so than in sectors like pharma and computers which are innovative but not new, i.e. in a relatively 
mature phase of their industry life-cycle (Klepper 1997).  This may be because the market reacts 
more strongly to innovative firms in stagnant sectors (since these firms “stick out” from the crowd, 
i.e. their competitors), and innovative firms in very new sectors because there are higher hopes in 
such sectors. Innovation by firms in dynamic but mature industries, like pharma and computers, 
instead produce less of a reaction since they are not necessarily more innovative than their peers, 
and also the technology is at a relatively certain stage of its development (there is a core of 
persistent innovators and less market share instability, Mazzucato 2002).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II contains a review of recent work which links  
stock price dynamics to innovation.  Section III provides background on the particular measure of 
volatility used in the paper: idiosyncratic risk. Section IV discusses our data and methodology,.  
Section V presents the results from our industry level analysis of 34 industries and Section VI the 
results from our firm level analysis of five industries with different levels of innovativeness: 
biotechnology, computers, pharmaceuticals, textiles and agriculture.  Section VII concludes by 
considering possible reasons why our results differ at the industry and firm level. 
II. Innovation and stock prices 
Uncertainty in finance models refers to how expectations about a firm’s future growth affects 
its market valuation, hence its stock prices (Pastor and Veronesi 2004)i.  Yet few of these models 
link stock price dynamics to innovation variables at the level of the firm and industry (Mazzucato 
2002).  This is surprising given that most shocks are idiosyncratic to the firm or plant (Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1992) and investment in innovation is expensive and its outcome very uncertain.  The 
uncertainty associated with innovation is why Frank Knight (1921)—an early pioneer of risk theory—
and John Maynard Keynes (1973), both distinguished ‘risk’ from ‘uncertainty’ in their works, often 
using technological innovation as an example of true uncertainty.  They argued that while a risky 
event can be evaluated via probabilities based on priors (e.g. a lottery), an uncertain event, such as 
a new invention, cannotii.  
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The few studies that do relate stock price dynamics to innovation, do so mainly by linking 
changes in the stock price leveliii to innovation, rather than changes in volatility of stock prices to 
innovation.  Furthermore, they are mainly concerned with aggregate innovation dynamics (e.g. the 
effect of the New Economy or the IT revolution) rather than with firm or industry level innovation 
dynamics.  For example, Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) make predictions concerning the 
evolution of the average industry stock price level around the “shakeout” period of the industry life-
cycle.  Focusing on the US tire industry, they build a model which assumes that an industry is born 
as a result of a basic invention and that the shakeout occurs as a result of one major refinement to 
that invention.iv  They predict that just before the shakeout occurs the average stock price will fall 
because the new innovation precipitates a fall in product price which is bad news for incumbentsv.  
An example of a study that links stock price volatility to innovation is Shiller (2000), where it is 
shown that ‘excess volatility’, the degree to which stock prices are more volatile than the present 
value of discounted future dividends, peaks precisely during the second and third industrial 
revolutions when innovative activity was high (e.g. new GPTs).  Furthermore, Campbell et al. 
(2000), reviewed further below, relate the dynamics of “idiosyncratic risk” to general changes in the 
economy associated with the IT revolution.   
In this paper, we take the position that the link between volatility, innovation and uncertainty is 
better studied at the level of the firm since this allows it to be related to the firm’s specific 
environment.  In this same spirit, Mazzucato and Semmler (1999) and Mazzucato (2002) extend 
Shiller’s work to the industry level by studying the relationship between innovation and stock price 
volatility in two specific industries: autos and PCs.  There we find that both idiosyncratic risk and 
excess volatility were highest precisely during the periods in which innovation in these industries 
was the most ‘radical’ as measured by a quality change index (derived by dividing BEA prices by 
quality adjusted prices as in Filson 2001)vi.  This was also the period in which market shares were 
most unstable—due to the ‘destructive’ effect of technological change on the advantage of 
incumbents. 
In the current paper we ask whether these results can be generalized to different industries.  In 
particular, we ask whether firms and industries that spend more money on R&D, and hence are 
more innovative (at least as regards the input to innovation) experience more volatility of their stock 
returns.  If so, this provides further support to our claim that finance studies should pay more 
attention to the effect of firm and industry specific innovation dynamics on the dynamics of financial 
risk. 
We focus specifically on the dynamics of idiosyncratic risk due to its ability to capture the firm 
specific and industry specific nature of uncertainty, as reflected in the volatility of stock prices. Thus 
rather than assuming that greater volatility implies more uncertainty (as is done in the various 
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studies cited above as well as in more microeconomic finance studies such as Pastor and Veronesi 
2004), we see whether one of the most uncertain activities a firm can do (e.g. innovation) is in fact 
linked to volatility.  It is important to note that due to our interest in highlighting the role of innovation 
in increasing uncertainty and hence volatility, we ignore other sources of volatility, such as monetary 
policy, globalization of financial services, and globalization of output and input markets (a review of 
these sources can be found in Eichengreen and Bordo 1991, and Scheve and Slaughter 2004).  
III. Idiosyncratic risk 
 The volatility of individual stock returns can be broken down into three components: the 
market wide return, the industry specific residual and a firm specific residual. Idiosyncratic risk 
usually refers to this latter firm specific component. It is an element of price risk that can, in theory, 
be largely eliminated by diversification within an asset classvii.  It is sometimes called security 
specific risk or unsystematic risk.  In the Capital Asset Pricing Model, a regression of a firm’s (or 
industry’s) return against the market level return, the beta coefficient, denoting the covariance 
between individual returns and general market returns, captures the systematic component which 
varies inversely with idiosyncratic risk: the higher is beta, the higher is the covariance between the 
two returns hence the higher is the systematic component and the lower the idiosyncratic 
component of risk. 
As discussed above, there are very few industry level studies of volatility.  The few that exist 
focus on the reallocation of resources across sectors. viii Motivated by this lacuna, Campbell et al. 
(2000) conduct a rigorous empirical study of idiosyncratic risk on firm level and industry level data.  
Their aim is to test whether idiosyncratic risk has increased over time.  They analyze the volatility of 
returns, at the firm level, industry level and market level, from 1963 to 1997.  Volatility is calculated 
on a monthly base, through the sample variance of the daily data.  While the industry level analysis 
proves inconclusive, the firm level analysis suggests increased idiosyncratic risk since the 1960’s.  
Specifically, their main findings are: 
1. evidence of a positive deterministic time trend in stock return variances for individual firms, 
and no such evidence for market and industry return variances; 
2. evidence of declining correlations among individual stock returnsix; 
3. evidence that volatility moves counter-cyclically and tends to lead variations in GDP. 
In their conclusion, Campbell et al offer various explanations of why idiosyncratic risk might 
have increased.  These are:  
a) companies have begun to issue stock earlier in their life cycle when there is more uncertainty 
about future profits;  
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b) leverage effects;  
c) improved information about future cash flows due to the IT revolution;  
d) improved and quicker information via financial innovations (e.g. new derivative markets).  
The authors spend some time reviewing the mixed evidence on these effects.  For example, 
while improved information might increase the volatility of the stock price level, it should (at least in 
the case of constant discount rates) decrease the volatility of stock returns since it allows news to 
arrive earlier when cash flows are more heavily discounted.  In fact, the only explanation above 
whose effect is not ambiguous is the first one (a): since innovation tends to be more radical during 
early industry evolution when there are more technological opportunities available, it is assumed 
that idiosyncratic risk should be higher in new and/or high-tech industries which are characterized 
by greater uncertainty in expected future profits.  This assumption is also found in other works such 
as that of Pástor and Veronesi (2003, 2004) who find that uncertainty (proxied by volatility) 
increases the firm’s fundamental value and use this to explain the high value of technology stocks in 
the late 1990’s during the peak of the IT revolution—without actually having any information on 
innovation itself.   Our aim is to provide more substance to these types of assumptions by 
investigating directly the relationship between innovation and volatility (first using a sectoral 
taxonomy of innovation, and then using R&D intensity data). 
Unlike Campbell et al. (2000) to measure idiosyncratic risk we do not decompose the return of 
a ‘typical’ stock into its three components above (which sum up to the total return volatility), rather 
we calculate the ratio between the variance of a firm’s return and the variance of the return of the 
general market as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk and apply it to both firms and industries to capture 
the relative volatility (compared to the S&P500 index). Specifically, if rit is the return of firm i at time t 
(where P is the firm’s stock price and D is dividend): 
 
 
then, idiosyncratic risk, IRi,t, is the standard deviation of rit=[rit] divided by the standard deviation of 
the market return, RSP500,t :   ][
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To calculate industry specific idiosyncratic risk, firm i in Eqs 1-2 is replaced with industry j. 
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IV.  Data and methodology 
Following Campbell et al. (2000) we study idiosyncratic risk across different industries and 
firms.  Our aim is to test whether more innovative organisations are characterized by higher 
idiosyncratic risk.   At the industry level, we study the aggregate behavior of returns in 34 industries 
using quarterly returns data from 1976-1999.  At the firm level, we study the behavior of monthly 
returns and quarterly R&D intensity in five industries from 1974-2003: agriculture, textiles, 
pharmaceutical, computers and biotechnology. The 5 industries were chosen based on their clear 
ranking across the innovation spectrum: highly innovative (biotech); innovative (pharma and 
computer); and low innovative (textiles, agriculture).  We decided to use monthly S&P financial data, 
rather than daily data (e.g. CRSP), since it would be exaggerated to expect that quarterly R&D 
figures have an impact on a daily basis.  For this reason annual volatility figures calculated using 
monthly returns data, were compared with quarterly R&D data. 
Using information from various sectoral classifications found in the literature on sectoral 
taxonomies of innovation (Pavitt 1984; Marsili 2001, EC 1996), the 34 industries used in our industry 
level analysis are divided into ‘very innovative’, ‘innovative’ and ‘low innovative’.  Although we focus 
the discussion in the paper solely to manufacturing industries, we retain the results that pertain to 
the services industries (insurance, retail, banks, dept. stores, food chains, financial, restaurants, 
entertainment, electrical utilities, public utilities), and assume that they fall into the ‘low innovative’ 
category due to empirical studies that have shown R&D intensity to be very low in these sectors 
(EC, 1996).  Table A1 and A2  (from Marsili 2001) include all the manufacturing industries included 
in our data set, except for aluminum, integrated domestics and natural gas pipelines. We thus do 
not discuss these three industries in our results as we are not sure regarding their “innovativeness” 
(and assume that all service industries are included in low innovativeness).  
After discussing the descriptive statistics on the sample employed, in a first step of the 
analysis we develop 34 bivariate VAR representations of the industry-level and market-level stock 
returns, and perform a Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) analysis in order to capture 
the degree of idiosyncratic risk of the series. Assuming that the expected behavior of profits and/or 
growth is more uncertain - and thus volatile - in innovative firms/sectors, we expect to find that the 
percentage of the industry-level predictive error variance is mostly explained by the idiosyncratic 
shock, i.e. by the industry-specific shock. This also implies that the forecast error variance explained 
by the generic (i.e. SP500) shock should be lower in innovative sectors and higher in less innovative 
sectors.   
In a second step, following the approach developed in Campbell et al (2000), the analysis is 
conducted in the context of the CAPM model. We pool the industry-level sample information 
obtaining a balanced panel with time dimension T (88 observations) and sectional dimension N (34 
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observations), and regress the industry-level stock returns on industry-specific dummies (Fixed 
Effects) and the SP500 returns. This set up allows a test of the efficient market hypothesis and, 
particularly, testing the heterogeneity in the sectional dimension. In line with the results obtained by 
Campbell et al. (2000), we also obtain a measure of the percentage of variability explained by the 
regression. As long as the behavior of stock prices and returns in innovative sectors is mostly 
affected by idiosyncratic factors, the variability explained by the regression should result higher for 
the low innovative industries and lower for the more innovative industries.  
In the firm-level analysis, the empirical investigation is developed by directly testing the 
existence of a positive relationship between idiosyncratic riskx and the firm-level degree of 
innovativeness, proxied by R&D intensity (R&D expenditures divided by sales).  By focusing on 
R&D intensity we are focusing on innovative effort (innovation input rather than innovation output 
such as patents).  Yet since in the literature on patents, R&D intensity has also been found to be 
highly correlated with both patent counts and patent citations (Pakes 1985, Hall et al. 2005) we don’t 
think the results are overly biased.  Nevertheless, in our work in progress, focused on the 
pharmaceutical industry, we consider the patent based information as well (Mazzucato and Tancioni 
2005).  
We estimate panel regressions in which firm-level idiosyncratic risk depends on R&D intensity 
and a proxy for firm size: the log ratio between the average market capitalization of the firm and the 
average capitalization of the S&P500, both calculated on an annual basis (the ratio includes the 
annual industry average capitalization when the analysis is conducted on the industry-specific sub-
samples).  We control for firm size (using market value) to avoid spurious results, i.e. that the 
volatility of returns of small and innovative firms is higher because they are small instead of the fact 
that they are innovative.  We also introduced other control variables such as earnings and 
employment but found that these did not vary the significance of the results in any way.  Although it 
would be interesting, we do not control for more complex phenomena like the effect of globalization 
of output or input markets since we do not have data on which firms in a given industry, or which 
industries in the economy, are affected more by globalization (Scheve and Slaughter 2004). In our 
future work we plan to partially capture these phenomena by adding a control which accounts for 
the degree to which industries utilize new technologies such as IT.   
The dimension of the unbalanced panelxi employed is quite big, as we have 30 observations in 
the time dimension T (yearly, 1974-2003) and 965 observations in the sectional dimension N (firms). 
The analysis is conducted both employing the pooled panel sample and the five different industry-
specific panels of firms.  The strategy of analysis is discussed in greater detail in each section.                      
The industry level data comes from hard copies of the annual editions of the Standard and 
Poor’s Analysts Handbooks while the firm level data, including annual R&D expenditures, comes 
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from the electronic Standard and Poor’s Compustat database (purchased via custom order from 
S&P). While the industry level data is available on a quarterly basis, the firm level data is available 
on a monthly basis—a higher frequency that is more appropriate for volatility studies.  Unfortunately, 
we did not have access to continuous R&D data for the industry level analysis.  But since the 
sectoral taxonomy of innovation used in Tables A1-A2 was constructed using average R&D intensity 
data (as well as other technology indicators related to patents, entry barriers etc., see Marsili 2001), 
comparison of return volatility with the level of innovativeness suggested in the taxonomy indirectly 
captures the R&D intensity information.  
For the firm level analysis the volatility of returns is calculated annually, through the standard 
deviations between 12 (month) terms. In this way, the monthly frequency of the financial information 
collapses to the annual frequency. The firm-level intensity of innovation is proxied by  R&D intensity, 
i.e. by the log ratio between R&D expenditure and total sales.  Since sales and R&D firm-level data 
are both available on a quarterly basis, quarterly flows are summed and collapsed to the annual 
frequency.  
V. Industry level analysis  
Table 1 provides a descriptive analysis of the sample. It focuses on the standard two moments 
of the different industry level time series as well as the contemporaneous sample correlations 
between general market (SP500) and industry level rates of returns. On the basis of the discussion 
above, we expect variability in the innovative industries to be higher than average, and correlations 
between industry-level and market returns to be higher for the more traditional, less innovative 
industries.   
If we look at the standard deviations in Table 1, evidence in favor of the expected results is 
found only for semi-conductors, transports and, to a minor extent, for aerospace and defense.  
Surprisingly, high variability is also displayed by tobacco and the forest product (publishing), natural 
gas pipelines and building materials, all considered “low-innovative” according to Table A1 and A2.   
As expected, low variability is found for more traditional and low innovative industries such as public 
utilities, metal and glass confectionery, brewers and alcoholics, electrical equipment and food 
chains. However, against our expectations, very low variability is found for the more innovative 
electronic instruments industry.  
With respect to the correlations between each industry’s returns with the average market 
returns, moderate values are obtained for semiconductors, transports, electronic instruments and 
natural gas pipelines, all below 0.5. The higher correlations are instead found for electrical 
equipment, chemicals and coal, financial and retail stores industries, all above the value of 0.8.   
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Hence, the evidence from the descriptive analysis is rather mixed.  Expectations appear 
satisfied only for some industries at the very extremes of the taxonomy but not for others.  Since 
one of the reasons why we find these mixed results might be related to the fact that we are 
averaging across periods that have different levels of innovativeness (for both the innovative and 
the less innovative industries), we look briefly to the dynamics over time.   
The behavior of standard deviations (SD) of returns over time, calculated as four terms 
(yearly) SDs,  provides some insight into the reason for our mixed results. Fig 1 illustrates the SD 
dynamics for two innovative industries (semiconductors and electronic instruments), one medium-
innovative industry (chemicals and coal) and one low-innovative industries (food chains).   We are 
encouraged to find that for both the innovative industries, the periods of greatest volatility as 
compared to the S&P 500, are precisely the periods that the more qualitative and in-depth case 
study literature on those industries identify as being particularly innovative periods (see Malerba 
1985 for semiconductors, and Bresnahan and Greenstein 1997 for electronic instruments). That is, 
the mid 1980’s for semiconductors and the 1990s for electrical equipment.  This suggests that the 
effect of innovation on idiosyncratic risk is both industry-specific and time-specific, hence it cannot 
be studied with respect to single time dimensions of the sample information (by focusing the 
analysis on one dimension only, results are likely to be biased, as it implies averaging over the other 
dimension).  On the contrary, for the low-innovative industries, the SDs closely follow the behavior 
of the SP500 returns, signaling no period specificities for which an innovation-related explanation 
can be advancedxii.  
Hence, apart from some selected industries at the extreme of the innovation-sectoral 
taxonomy, the descriptive analysis appears unable to give clear results. It makes most sense for the 
industries in the extreme of the categorization while for the others it is difficult to derive some 
reasonable interpretation of their descriptive measures.  Looking, however, at the dynamic 
dimension of the relationship, we gather some initial insights on why the industry analysis is so 
inconclusive.   
Another reason behind our mixed results might be the fact that we have not included controls 
for changes in monetary policy, globalization of financial services, and globalization of output and 
input markets.  Not only do we not have this data, but as we have no information (or hypotheses) on 
why such forces should affect specific industries more than others, we do not think this would have 
necessarily been useful.   
Before moving on to the firm level analysis, we try to gain further insights first through variance 
decomposition analysis and then by testing for the relationship between innovation and IR within a 
CAPM model, both methods used in Campbell et al. (2005).  
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Va. VAR representation: forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) analysis 
As briefly discussed above, as a first step we analyze the dynamic relationships between the 
general market and the industry specific stock returns volatility employing a bi-variate Vector Auto 
Regressive (VAR) representation between SP500 and industry returns. A VAR is estimated for each 
of the 34 industries considered in the sample.    
The starting VAR formulation for the different industries is the following:  
tlt
p
l lt
εyΠy += −=∑ 1 ,   0ε =)( tE ,  Σεε =)( ,ttE   st ≠∀              (3) 
where, according to the single industry j being modelled, jty = [ ]'500, tjt RSPR ,  j = 1…34, jR  
are industry-specific returns and  RSP500 market returns. They are obtained as logs of returns (see 
Eq. 2).    
The lag order p of each VAR is selected according to the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) 
and the condition of spherical errors. The VARs are then employed as the basic structure for 
running the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) analyses. The FEVD analysis provides 
a decomposition of the relative weight of one variable’s (m) shock in explaining the predictive error 
variability of another variable (n) at different time leadsxiii. If the FEVD of a variable at a given 
horizon is explained entirely by the idiosyncratic shock, then its forecast at that horizon does not 
improve when considering the behaviour of the other variable’s shock. Symmetrical considerations 
are valid in the case in which the FEV of the first variable is dominated by the second variable’s 
shockxiv.   
Our hypothesis is that if idiosyncratic risk affects the volatility of industry specific stock returns, 
then the general market dynamics is not a valid predictor for them.  We expect, in fact, the general 
market shocks to have low predictive capabilities for the innovative industries’ stock returns 
volatility. In other words, from FEVDs we expect to find a lower contribution of S&P500 shocks in 
generating the forecast error variances of the more innovative industries’ returns, hence, a bigger 
presence of industry specific variance.  
Table 2 contains the results from the FEVD analysis, obtained with the industry-specific 
bivariate VARs described above. The values reported are valid for the idiosyncratic shock 
contribution to the industry-specific forecast error variance.  The results are again not very clear.  
The expectations are clearly satisfied, again, only for semiconductors and transports, even if some 
favorable evidence emerges also for other industries deemed to be innovative in Tables A1-A2 
(automobiles, integrated domestics).  For semiconductors and transports, the forecast variance at a 
1 quarter horizon is dominated almost entirely by idiosyncratic shocks, on average explaining, 
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respectively, about 96% and 99% of the total variability of the series. The values at a 10 quarter 
horizon are still high, respectively 95% and 94%. The lowest contribution of idiosyncratic shocks to 
the 1-quarter FEV  is found for the financial industry (nearly 28%), electrical equipment (32%) and   
forest products (both publishing and paper nearly 40%).  
Even if for this limited group outcomes are substantially in line with the expectations,  we are 
still far from having obtained a favorable result for our hypothesis of higher variability in innovative 
industries. The main problem is that, even with the VAR-FEVD analysis, the evidence remains again 
mixed for all the industries that  are not classified at the extremes of the innovation sectoral 
taxonomy employed here. 
Vb.  The CAPM hypothesis and industry-level innovation intensity  
In this section we adopt a different point of view. We evaluate the empirical relevance of the 
CAPM predictions by directly testing the relationships between industry and market level returns. 
The CAPM postulates the existence of a linear relationship between the expected risk and the 
returns of holding a portfolio of financial assets. If markets are efficient, the ratio between a portfolio 
premium on a risk-free asset and its standard deviation (which is a measure of perceived risk) 
equals the ratio between market premium and market risk, i.e.: ( ) ( ) mfmpfp rrrr σσ −=− , where r 
are portfolio p, market m and risk-free asset f returns and mp,σ  are standard deviations. The 
equality above can be re-written as ( ) ( )fm
m
p
fp rrrr −=− σ
σ
, which justifies the well-known alpha-
beta CAPM relation uRR mp ++= βα . The estimate of the beta coefficient is ( ) ( )mmp RVarRRCov ,  
, hence its dimension is directly related to the co-variation between returns. If a particular industry 
denotes specific volatility patterns over time, this affects the “betas” dimension and, if specificities 
are systematic, these result in statistically significant “alphas”.   
For the scope of our analysis, we test whether the hypothesis of unit slope coefficients (i.e. the 
“betas”, denoting the covariance between the individual firm or industry returns and the average 
market returns) can be empirically established. Our conjecture is that departures from CAPM, i.e. 
from optimal behavior assumed in the efficient market model (EMM), are the result of perceived 
uncertainty regarding expected future profits.  As a consequence, as long as uncertainty and 
idiosyncratic risk are related to the innovative activity - which is our basic assumption in this work – 
we should observe that departures from CAPM are more likely for those sectors that are more 
innovative according to our classification. Our specific aim is thus to obtain a test of the efficient 
market hypothesis and, in particular, a measure of heterogeneity in the relationship between 
industry-level and market level rates of return. This requires testing the equality of the intercepts and 
the slope coefficients in the CAPM regressions. Specifically, we expect to find bigger intercepts and 
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non-unit, or statistically meaningless, betas for the innovative industries. Following Campbell et al 
(2000), further indications on the empirical relevance of the CAPM can be obtained with the 
evaluation of the variability explained by the sectional regressions. Given our assumptions, we thus 
expect the percentage of variability explained by the regression to be lower for the innovative 
industries.    
The data base employed here is a well-dimensioned panel, which has been obtained by 
pooling the industry-level data previously employed for the VAR estimates. The resulting sample 
contains 88 observations in the time dimension and 34 observations in the sectional (industry) 
dimension, for a total of nearly 3,000 observations.  
The structure of the sample thus allows a flexible and detailed modeling of the relationship 
under question.  Since the aim of the analysis is to test whether there are systematic differences in 
the relationship between industry level returns and market returns, a natural model candidate is the 
Fixed Effects (FE) representation of the CAPM hypothesis:  
jttjjt RSPR εβα ++= 500 ,             (4) 
where, 'jα s are the FE coefficients and β  is the common beta coefficient (covariance) of the 
CAPM. The FE model assumes that the section-specific effects on the dependent variable can be 
described by heterogeneous constant terms only, in other words, by dummies operating as intercept 
shifters of the linear relations. This represents a standard assumption for panel samples with T fixed 
and N large. Given the availability of a panel with moderate sectional (N) dimension and a 
sufficiently large time dimension, we can generalize the reference specification to an heterogeneous 
panel model in which the betas are not restricted to be the same across industries: 
jttjjjt RSPR εβα ++= 500 ,            (5) 
This specification, that represents our reference model for testing the CAPM, allows a 
straightforward implementation of a testing strategy (Wald) for the evaluation of the heterogeneity in 
parameters, with particular reference to the betas.   
As regards the estimation approach, we base our choice on the particular cross-correlation 
structure of the data. We first test the diagonality of the variance-covariance errors matrixxv (i.e. the 
absence of cross-dependencies between equations of the system) by implementing a likelihood 
ratio test (LR) for the null hypothesis that the off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance 
system errors matrix are zeroxvi. If the hypothesis is accepted, the model is estimated with Ordinary 
or Weighted Least Squares methods (OLS-FGLS). If it is rejected, we assume that relevant cross-
dependencies are present, opting for a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimator (SURE).  
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The LR test of diagonality of the system errors variance-covariance matrix gives a value of 
1,951.7 which, compared with a chi-sq. distribution with 528 degrees of freedom, strongly rejects the 
null hypothesis of a diagonal error structure. The reference estimator is thus the SURE. 
The FE dummies are generally statistically significant and the hypothesis of common 
intercepts is strongly rejectedxvii. The slopes coefficients (the betas) are always significant at the 
standard critical values, while the hypotheses of common unit betas and of equality of the betas are 
decisively rejectedxviii, signaling strong heterogeneity also for the slope coefficients. The hypothesis 
of unit betas can be accepted for some industries only (See Table 3). Even if some of the most 
innovative industries belong to this group, it is impossible to detect clear regularities that can be 
considered significantly aligned with our predictions.  
In their study on trends in idiosyncratic risk Campbell et al. (2000) analyzed the behavior over 
time of the variability explained by CAPM regressions. They obtain that the R-bar sq. of the 
regressions between individual firm returns and market returns decreased over time. Amongst the 
possible explanations of why this is (and in general why there is a positive deterministic time trend in 
stock return variances for individual firms), they suggest the fact that companies have begun to 
issue stock earlier in their life cycle when there is more uncertainty about future profits.  We build on 
this in our assumption that differences in the CAPM model’s ability to account for the variability of 
results can be the outcome of shifts in perceived idiosyncratic risk and uncertainty, in turn related to 
the degree of innovativeness of the single industry/firm. Consequently, we are interested in 
analyzing if differences in the industry specific R-bar sq. over the cross-section can be explained by 
differences in the innovative intensities of the specific industries.   
Table 3 summarizes the results of the industry level SUR estimation of the CAPM formulation, 
reporting (for sake of simplicity) only the R bar sq. and the betas statistics (with standard errors).  
The variance explained by the regressions partly confirms the expectations, being approximately 
zero for semiconductors and transports and low for electronic instruments, and automobiles, all 
classified as relatively innovative sectors. Expectedly, the maximum values are obtained with the 
regressions of the paper, forest and publishing industries, the banking and financial sector, the 
electrical equipment and chemicals and coal sectors. These are classified in Tables A1-A2 as low 
innovative industries, showing again that our hypothesis meets some empirical support if the 
attention is focused on only some industries at the extremes of the classification. 
Vc. Conclusion of industry level analysis 
In sum, the industry level analysis has not produced clear-cut results.  A common finding in 
this section is that, independently of the method of investigation employed, our expectations seem 
to be only fulfilled in the extremes of the innovative ness categorization.  A possible explanation for 
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our inconclusive industry level results is the effect of looking at industry averages, i.e. of aggregating 
firms to get industry level values (e.g. variance of industry returns), when in actuality within each 
industry (both innovative and non-innovative) there is a great deal of variety between firms in their 
returns, R&D intensity, profits (i.e. persistent inter-firm ‘variety’ emphasized in evolutionary 
economics, Nelson and Winter 1982).  This drawback is particularly relevant for those industries 
classified as “intermediate” in the innovation categorization, as their internal composition is less 
homogeneous in terms of innovativeness.  However, as will be seen at the end of the firm level 
analysis in Section VI, when we test for this aggregation problem we find it not to be significant. 
Another factor which might have contributed to our mixed results, already briefly discussed 
above, concerns the time dimension: some periods are more innovative than others (for both 
innovative and non-innovative industries).  That is, even if an industry is relatively innovative on 
average, this does not mean that it is particularly innovative for the whole period considered in the 
analysis.  In fact, we have seen in the descriptive analysis in Fig. 1 that time-varying standard 
deviations of returns for some selected industries are especially high during specific periods in 
which the industries experienced more radical innovation (see also Mazzucato 2002 for discussion). 
To get beyond both these problems, we now turn to the firm level analysis. As we have annual 
R&D data for the firms, we can study more directly the dynamic dimension of the relationship in 
question.   
VI.  Firm-level analysis: R&D intensity and idiosyncratic risk   
In this section we show that the hypothesis of a positive and relevant relationship between 
idiosyncratic risk and innovation is not rejected by the data when the analysis is conducted at the 
firm-level and when innovation intensity is taken into account.  
We employ a panel of 822 firms belonging to 5 different industriesxix - for which we have 
monthly observations for the period 1974-2003 – and directly test the existence of a positive 
relationship between idiosyncratic risk and innovative effort (R&D intensity). In particular, we 
estimate panel regressions in which firm-level idiosyncratic risk depends on R&D effort and the 
firm’s relative weight in terms of market capitalizationxx. The analysis is conducted both employing 
the whole panel sample and the five different industry-specific panels of firms.  
As discussed in section III, the monthly frequency of the financial information is transformed to 
the annual frequency.  Table 4 includes summary data for different decades. In the last decade 
(1994-2003), idiosyncratic risk increased in all industries considered in the analysis, while during the 
decade between the mid eighties and the mid nineties we can detect a contraction for agriculture 
and textile and an increase for the other industries. Concerning the innovation intensity, for all the 
industries but agriculture there is a clear positive variation, which is particularly strong for computers 
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during the period 1984-1993 and for the pharmaceutical and the textiles industries during the period 
1994-2003.  For biotech the increase in innovative intensity is strong in both periods. Agriculture 
signals a relevant decrease in innovative activity during the last decade.  
This evidence is undoubtedly insufficient for deriving objective indications on the role of 
innovative effort in determining volatility and idiosyncratic risk.  The existence of an increase in both 
innovative intensity and IR appears unquestionable, and constitutes a first indication which is 
consistent with our hypothesisxxi.  In the next section we test this relationship directly.  
VI a. Model selection 
The panel structure of the data-set suggests to employ as natural model alternatives the 
following 3 specifications: the pooled, the Fixed Effects (FE) and the Random Effects (RE) 
specifications.  After obtaining an appraisal of the results in the pooled estimator casexxii, the 
analysis then focuses on the evaluation of the opportunity of introducing either a systematic or 
random representation of the  firm-specific effects.   
We have seen that the FE model assumes that the section-specific effects on the dependent 
variable can be described by heterogeneous constant terms only. The RE model differs from the FE 
model in that it employs a common intercept and presumes that the sectional specificities are 
random, even if fixed over timexxiii. The rationale of the RE model is that the firm effects are not 
systematic, i.e. that they are orthogonal to the regressors.   
The model selection procedure is implemented in two steps, first evaluating the statistical 
relevance of the individual (firm) effects and then whether they are correlated with the regressors. 
This is done by testing, via the Breusch-Pagan LM test, for the presence of individual effectsxxiv 
against the common constant model (pooled estimator), and then testing the orthogonality of the 
individual effects, i.e. the RE specification, with the FE as alternative hypothesis. In this second step 
the reference evaluation tool is the Hausman test. 
In order to check if relevant dynamic structures are present, the alternative specifications are 
also estimated with Maximum Likelihood entering up to four lags of the R&D intensity variable. Even 
if we obtain statistically significant results when including one lag of our innovation variable, results 
are stronger when R&D intensity is entered contemporaneously. This is not particularly surprising as 
we are employing annual – low frequency - data and our dependent variable is a measure of 
perceived risk. We are in fact considering a market signal and not a realised market performance 
(permanent increase in market valuation, sales). In the latter case relevant lag structures between 
R&D input and real performance are likely and in fact they are often observed in the literature (Hall 
et al. 2005).  Moreover, previous investigations on market volatility have shown that volatility can 
lead variations in market valuation and price/earning ratios (Engle, Ng and Rothschild, 1990, Engle 
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and Ng, 1993 Pastor and Veronesi, 2003, 2004). Interestingly, the regression of R&D intensity on 
lagged volatility resulted statistically meaningless, signalling that market volatility does not lead R&D 
intensity.  
VI b. Results   
According to the two-step strategy implemented for choosing the appropriate specification of 
the model, from the Breusch-Pagan test we obtain that the firm specific effects (which at this stage 
we don’t know whether systematic [FE] or random[RE]) are always relevant irrespective of the 
model (with or without the inclusion of MV ) and the industry considered, i.e. the hypothesis of 
stable variance over section ( uH o
2:σ ) is always rejected by the data.  
Substantial differences among different industries emerge in the second step of the analysis. 
For both the standard model (the one in which idiosyncratic risk is regressed on R&D intensity only, 
M1) and the extended model (the one including the dimension variable, M2), the Hausman test 
suggests selecting a RE specification for the textile, agriculture, biotechnology and computer 
industries, while a FE specification is preferred when the data-set employed is the whole sample or 
the pharmaceutical industry sub-sample onlyxxv. Model selection tests are summarized in Table A3.   
Estimation results, which are summarized in Table 5, are very encouraging. Except for 
agriculture, the estimated coefficient for the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and R&D 
intensity is always positive and statistically significant, irrespective of the model and the sample 
considered. The statistical significance of results is in fact not affected by the introduction of the 
control for firm size MV , whose effect on idiosyncratic risk is, in line with the expectations, negative, 
large and statistically significant for all the different estimates of the extended modelxxvi. This fact is 
particularly important as it shows that, even if the firms’ dimension plays an important role in 
explaining the behaviour of our measure of idiosyncratic risk, it is not crucial for obtaining the 
expected results. Under this perspective, the outcomes are thus robust to the particular model 
employed.  
The size of the various coefficients suggests that there are substantial inter-industry 
differences.  This may be due to various factors (not testable here), for example, that R&D intensity 
is a weak proxy for innovation (due to the fact it is only an input to innovation), or that its effect on 
market valuation differs depending on industry specific factors (not entirely captured here), such as 
the specific phase of the industry life-cycle.  Furthermore, there is no guarantee that R&D intensity 
is stronger in firms that are developing radical projects, as it may happen that bigger resources are 
placed by firms that are developing a less risky process/product.  In this second case, which is likely 
for firms belonging to mature but innovative sectors (computers, pharmaceuticals), we in fact find 
firms displaying high R&D intensity and only moderate IRxxvii.   
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Even if IR and innovation intensity are, on average, higher in the biotech industry than in the 
textile industry (see Table 4), this does not imply that the co-variation is higher in the more 
innovative industry.  In fact, it is likely that the co-variation is more evident in traditional industries, 
where the market valuation of firms is more certain (and stable) on average so that being highly 
innovative makes the firm stand out and have an impact in terms of expectations about future 
growth.  Hence, the fact that the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and R&D intensity is 
stronger for the textile industry signals that the evidence is more likely to emerge in a low-innovative 
cluster, in which differences between innovative and non-innovative firms are more evident.  
Nevertheless, the relationship between IR and R&D intensity is weaker when we employ the 
whole sample. This last result is explained by the fact that the relationship of interest is not 
significant for the firms of the agriculture industry and that it is quite weak for those belonging to the 
pharmaceutical industry, as their weight in terms of number of sectional observations on total 
sample sectional observations is relevant (nearly 30%).   
It is interesting to note that the correction for firm size (MV) is particularly important in the 
biotechnology industry and only modest in the textile industry.   Even if we can suppose that in the 
early stages of an industry life cycle there is higher probability of observing a population of small 
and innovative firms, our results do not find any correlation between firm size and innovativeness: 
the introduction of firm size in the extended model (M2 in Table 5) does not affect the R&D 
coefficient found in the simple model (M1). Therefore, the large MV coefficient found for biotech is 
only attributable to the low average relative market value of the firms in terms of capitalization, 
which in turn constitutes a peculiarity of the early stages in the life cycle of new industries but not of 
their degree of innovativeness.  This finding is most likely a result of the proxy for innovation being 
used (R&D intensity): as emphasized by Schumpeter (1975), R&D is very costly process, often 
affordable only to large firms.  But since the search for innovation occurs through various routes 
(e.g. discussion above on “random search” and “guided search” in pharma), then it might be that 
using a different proxy for innovation (e.g. patents) might have found a stronger relationship. Our 
work in progress on this subject using patent data will hopefully further illuminate this question 
(Mazzucato and Tancioni 2005).  
 To further explore the effect of firm size on our results, we re-estimated Model 1 and Model 2 
using two different samples.  In the first sample we excluded the leading firm in each industry in 
terms of MV (the following firms were dropped: Westpoint-Pepperell, Amgen Inc., Bristol Myers 
Squibb, IBM, Archer-Daniels-Midland), In the second, we excluded those firms whose market value 
was more more than 10% of the total industry capitalisation (in this case 43 firms out of 822 are 
dropped, 5 belonging to the agriculture sector, 12 to the textile sector, 10 to the biotech sector and 8 
to the pharma and computer sectors). Results remain perfectly in line with those obtained employing 
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the whole sample, signalling that the presence of big firms in the sample does not alter the statistical 
significance of the relationship.    
The general and important result emerging from the firm-level analysis is that a positive 
relationship between innovative effort and idiosyncratic risk can be empirically established and thus 
that our hypothesis is not rejected by the data. Moreover, the outcomes are also robust to model 
extensions and, with the exception of the agriculture industry, to the particular sub-sample 
employed. 
Finally, to understand why the industry analysis proved so inconclusive, we also test for 
aggregation bias in various ways: (1) by pooling the sectional and time dimensions of the firm 
sample and controlling for industries, re-running the industry-level analysis of the CAPM hypothesis, 
with the only difference being the use of firm-level data; and (2) by calculating the industry means 
from firm-level data, we reproduce the firm-level analysis of the previous section employing industry-
level data. We conclude that aggregation bias does not constitute a major problem for the qualitative 
assessment of the relationship of interest, its only effect being of leading to the irrelevance of the 
dimension parameter.  This means that the major responsibility for the inconclusive outcomes for 
the industry level analysis must be attributed to the fact that the static sectoral taxonomy, whereby 
an industry is classified as either innovative or non innovative in a specific time period, neglects the 
dynamic dimension of innovation at the industry level (either annual R&D intensity information, or 
annual sectoral taxonomy), i.e. that over that period the industry might change its degree of 
innovation intensity.  
VII  Conclusion     
The paper has found that results concerning the relationship between innovativeness and 
stock return volatility is rather mixed.  In line with the findings found in Campbell et al. (2000), results 
using industry level data find no coherent pattern between innovation and idiosyncratic risk.  While 
some of the innovative industries conform to the predicted behavior of higher idiosyncratic risk (e.g. 
semiconductors), other innovative ones do not (e.g. aircraft).  The same holds for the low innovative 
industries.  In fact, our expectations seem to be only fulfilled in the extremes of the categorization. 
As in Campbell et al (2000), more clear results concerning idiosyncratic risk emerge using firm 
level data.  Here we find that firms with the highest R&D intensity clearly have the highest 
idiosyncratic risk, a confirmation of our main hypothesis.  A positive and contemporaneous 
relationship between idiosyncratic risk and innovation intensity is empirically established and this 
result is robust to model extensions, such as the control for firm dimension, and – with the exception 
of the agricultural industry - to the particular sub-sample employed. 
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Interestingly, we find that it is not true that this relationship between R&D intensity and volatility 
is stronger for firms in industries that are more “innovative” (according to the taxonomy used in 
Section V).  We find, for example, that the relationship holds stronger in a very innovative industry 
like biotechnology and a low innovative industry like textiles than in pharmaceuticals (high 
innovative).  Concerning the latter, we hypothesize that this is because the low average R&D 
intensity in textiles makes innovative firms in that industry ‘stick out’, and hence for the reaction (by 
market analysts) to their innovativeness be stronger.  Furthermore, while innovation in a mature but 
innovative industry, like pharma or computers, may be high (expressed through a high R&D 
intensity and/or number of patents), it’s commercial outcome is often less uncertain than in new 
emerging sectors (like biotech and nanotechnology) or in old sectors where innovation activity is not 
intense (textiles), and hence causes less of a reaction by market analysts.    
A look at how volatility changes over time, shows that idiosyncratic risk is highest precisely 
during those decades when innovation is the most radical and “competence destroying”: e.g. 
computers (1989-1997) and biotechnology (1995-2003).   However, as we did not have yearly R&D 
figures at the industry level we were not able to capture this dynamic element in the industry level 
analysis.  
We also show that the discrepancy in results obtained with the industry and firm-level analyses 
are not attributable to aggregation biases, even if the results obtained here do not rule out their role 
for other specific aspects of the analysis.  Instead, the inconclusiveness of the industry level results 
is mostly attributable to the fact that the innovation measure used there (the sectoral taxonomy) was 
static, so that it does not allow consideration of how innovation changes over time, as suggested in 
Figure 1 (e.g. an industry may be highly innovative in one period and less so in another when the 
life-cycle becomes mature), or when the knowledge regime changes (Gambardella 1995).   
Even if in the firm level analysis it has been possible to establish the existence of a direct link 
between R&D intensity and volatility, the analysis that we develop cannot be employed for 
explaining the heterogeneity found across industries, only the heterogeneity within industries, i.e. at 
the firm level.  This may be due to the fact that R&D intensity is only an indicator of innovative input 
not output.  Nevertheless, we believe our results represent a further step in linking stock price 
volatility and innovation dynamics at the firm and industry level.  On this basis, and given that it is 
important to also take into consideration innovative output, our future work focuses on incorporating 
patent citation data into stock price volatility analysis (Mazzucato and Tancioni 2005).   
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Figure 1: Standard deviations (4 terms moving averages 1977-1999) for four selected industries 
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Sample: 1976q1-1997q3. Source: Standard and Poor’s Analysts Handbooks 
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Table 1: Industry level stock returns, descriptive statistics 
Industry  Mean  Std. Dev. Corr SP500 Industry  Mean  Std. Dev. Corr SP500
AEROSP. DEFENCE 0.118 0.132 0.722 INSURANCE PROPERTY 0.129 0.099 0.685
ALLUMINIUM 0.077 0.117 0.531 INTEGR. DOMESTICS 0.198 0.111 0.621
AUTOMOBILES 0.079 0.129 0.551 METAL AND GLASS CONF. 0.059 0.092 0.582
BANKS 0.068 0.126 0.750 NAT. GAS PIPELINES 0.151 0.135 0.453
BREWERS AND ALCOOL 0.071 0.096 0.705 PAPER CONFECT 0.178 0.139 0.761
BUILD. MATERIALS 0.065 0.128 0.686 PAPER FOREST 0.173 0.114 0.747
CHEMICALS AND COAL 0.070 0.101 0.816 PUBLIC UTILITIES 0.084 0.064 0.681
COMPOSITE OIL 0.229 0.117 0.719 PUBLISHING FOREST 0.309 0.184 0.785
DEPT. STORE RETAIL 0.178 0.147 0.802 PUBLISHING NEWSP. 0.054 0.109 0.712
ELECRICAL EQUIPMENT 0.238 0.131 0.865 RESTAURANTS 0.050 0.106 0.669
ELECTRIC POWER COMP. 0.040 0.128 0.646 RETAIL COMP. 0.067 0.116 0.569
ELECTRONIC INSTR. 0.051 0.066 0.459 SEMICONDUCTORS 0.042 0.233 0.309
ENTERTAINMENT 0.114 0.118 0.692 SOFT DRINKS NON ALC. 0.154 0.128 0.792
FINANCIAL 0.036 0.103 0.809 TOBACCO 0.236 0.205 0.716
FOOD CHAINS RETAIL 0.091 0.099 0.701 TRANSPORT 0.088 0.183 0.323
HOSPITAL SUPPLIES 0.051 0.104 0.716 TRUCKER TRANSP. 0.063 0.126 0.596
INSURANCE MULTILINE 0.045 0.104 0.667 SP500 0.112 0.081 1.000
Sample: 1976q1-1997q3. Source: Standard and Poor’s Analysts Handbooks 
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Table 2: FEVDs  of the industry level rates of return, evaluated at different leads 
Industry 1 2 3 4 Industry 1 2 3 4
AEROSP. DEFENCE 56.1 56.4 56.4 49.9 INSURANCE PROPERTY 51.9 51.9 51.9 51.9
ALLUMINIUM 69.8 64.7 64.7 64.6 INTEGR. DOMESTICS 75.0 75.1 75.0 75.0
AUTOMOBILES 69.5 69.7 68.8 68.0 METAL AND GLASS CONF. 58.8 58.6 60.0 61.0
BANKS 51.1 51.1 51.1 51.1 NAT. GAS PIPELINES 85.2 85.2 85.2 85.2
BREWERS AND ALCOOL 59.1 59.1 59.1 59.1 PAPER CONFECT 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5
BUILD. MATERIALS 46.9 46.9 46.9 46.9 PAPER FOREST 40.7 44.1 44.3 44.3
CHEMICALS AND COAL 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 PUBLIC UTILITIES 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.5
COMPOSITE OIL 66.7 66.7 66.9 66.9 PUBLISHING FOREST 39.7 39.7 39.7 39.7
DEPT. STORE RETAIL 52.9 53.8 54.4 54.5 PUBLISHING NEWSP. 40.1 40.1 40.1 40.1
ELECRICAL EQUIPMENT 32.3 34.3 35.1 35.2 RESTAURANTS 48.9 48.9 48.9 48.9
ELECTRIC POWER COMP 75.9 75.9 75.9 75.9 RETAIL COMP. 58.1 58.1 58.1 58.1
ELECTRONIC INSTR. 54.9 54.5 53.7 53.5 SEMICONDUCTORS 95.7 95.1 95.1 95.1
ENTERTAINMENT 59.4 59.4 59.4 59.4 SOFT DRINKS NON ALC. 52.0 52.0 52.0 52.0
FINANCIAL 27.7 27.8 26.5 27.0 TOBACCO 63.2 63.2 63.2 63.2
FOOD CHAINS RETAIL 60.1 59.9 59.8 59.3 TRANSPORT 99.6 98.6 94.7 94.6
HOSPITAL SUPPLIES 47.1 47.1 47.1 47.1 TRUCKER TRANSP. 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5
INSURANCE MULTILINE 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0 SP500 - - - -
Forecast horizon (quarters) Forecast horizon (quarters)
 
Sample: 1976q1-1997q3. Source: Standard and Poor’s Analysts Handbooks. Computations executed with 
E-views 4.0. The variables are entered in the VAR as in equation 4 in the text above and the  shocks are 
identified employing a Cholesky triangular structure.  
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Table 3: Estimation of the CAPM hypothesis: betas and variability explained by the regressions 
Industry Beta coeff Std. Error t-Statistic Adj R-sq Industry Beta coeff Std. Error t-Statistic Adj R-sq
AEROSP. DEFENCE 1.169 0.121 9.687 0.516 INSURANCE PROPERTY 0.833 0.096 8.718 0.463
ALLUMINIUM 0.765 0.131 5.818 0.274 INTEGR. DOMESTICS 0.848 0.116 7.338 0.378
AUTOMOBILES 0.873 0.142 6.131 0.296 METAL AND GLASS CONF. 0.662 0.100 6.645 0.331
BANKS 1.159 0.110 10.521 0.558 NAT. GAS PIPELINES 0.754 0.160 4.709 0.196
BREWERS AND ALCOOL 0.833 0.090 9.207 0.490 PAPER CONFECT 1.300 0.119 10.892 0.575
BUILD. MATERIALS 1.080 0.124 8.746 0.464 PAPER FOREST 1.045 0.100 10.421 0.553
CHEMICALS AND COAL 1.016 0.078 13.100 0.662 PUBLIC UTILITIES 0.538 0.062 8.615 0.457
COMPOSITE OIL 1.034 0.108 9.588 0.511 PUBLISHING FOREST 1.774 0.151 11.740 0.611
DEPT. STORE RETAIL 1.450 0.117 12.439 0.639 PUBLISHING NEWSP. 0.958 0.102 9.390 0.500
ELECRICAL EQUIPMENT 1.393 0.087 15.957 0.745 RESTAURANTS 0.869 0.104 8.348 0.441
ELECTRIC POWER COMP 1.015 0.129 7.850 0.411 RETAIL COMP. 0.814 0.127 6.416 0.316
ELECTRONIC INSTR. 0.373 0.078 4.792 0.201 SEMICONDUCTORS 0.886 0.294 3.012 0.085
ENTERTAINMENT 1.006 0.113 8.881 0.472 SOFT DRINKS NON ALC. 1.243 0.103 12.028 0.623
FINANCIAL 1.024 0.080 12.761 0.650 TOBACCO 1.803 0.190 9.499 0.506
FOOD CHAINS RETAIL 0.855 0.094 9.110 0.485 TRANSPORT 0.728 0.230 3.162 0.093
HOSPITAL SUPPLIES 0.918 0.096 9.517 0.507 TRUCKER TRANSP. 0.926 0.134 6.886 0.348
INSURANCE MULTILINE 0.850 0.102 8.300 0.438 SP500 - - - -
Value Prob.
System log-Likelyhood 3910.5 -
LR test of diagonality of the var-cov matrix 1951.8 0.000
Wald test for equality of the alpha coefficients 1200.8 0.000
Wald test for equality of the beta coefficients 186.5 0.000
Wald test for unit betas 222.7 0.000
 
Sample: 1976q1-1997q3. Source: Standard and Poor’s Analysts Handbooks. Computations executed with 
E-views 4.0. Method: SURE 
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Table 4 A summary of the firm-level data, by industry and period. Average values  
Variable whole agricolture textile pharma computer biotech
ID. RISK 0.122 0.190 0.156 0.148 0.167 0.181
ID. RISK  74-83 0.094 0.218 0.141 0.120 0.139 0.154
ID. RISK  84-93 0.114 0.161 0.133 0.143 0.158 0.174
ID. RISK  94-03 0.158 0.191 0.197 0.185 0.209 0.218
R&D/Sales % 5.5% 1.8% 0.9% 5.4% 14.6% 4.7%
R&D/Sales 74-83 % 2.8% 1.2% 0.3% 4.1% 6.8% 1.3%
R&D/Sales 84-93 % 6.1% 3.3% 0.5% 4.6% 17.0% 5.0%
R&D/Sales 94-03 % 7.8% 0.7% 2.1% 7.6% 20.5% 8.2%
No of Firms 822 27 74 232 112 377
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. 
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Table 5 Estimation results for the selected model and specifications 
Sample Model Spec. Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob. R-sq within R-sq betw.
Whole M1 FE const. 0.1297 0.001 123.06 0.000 0.0009 0.0282
RDS 0.006 0.003 2.34 0.018
Whole M2 FE const. 0.131 0.001 98.20 0.000 0.0016 0.0801
RDS 0.006 0.003 2.34 0.018
MS -0.089 0.045 -1.97 0.049
TEX M1 RE const. 0.105 0.007 15.78 0.000 0.0518 0.3269
RDS 0.571 0.065 8.73 0.000
TEX M2 RE const. 0.108 0.006 18.00 0.000 0.0539 0.3322
RDS 0.573 0.065 8.82 0.000
MS -0.119 0.076 -1.57 0.117
AGR M1 RE const. 0.118 0.011 10.59 0.000 0.0131 0.0144
RDS -0.030 0.031 -0.96 0.338
AGR M2 RE const. 0.128 0.011 11.87 0.000 0.0048 0.2137
RDS -0.034 0.030 -1.12 0.265
MS -0.222 0.075 -2.96 0.003
BIO M1 RE const. 0.169 0.003 62.54 0.000 0.0011 0.0506
RDS 0.014 0.005 3.05 0.002
BIO M2 RE const. 0.169 0.003 62.54 0.000 0.007 0.1028
RDS 0.012 0.006 2.15 0.045
MS -0.430 0.052 -8.29 0.000
PHA M1 FE const. 0.109 0.002 47.22 0.000 0.0074 0.1191
RDS 0.008 0.002 3.65 0.000
PHA M2 FE const. 0.112 0.003 41.56 0.000 0.009 0.2061
RDS 0.008 0.002 3.57 0.000
MS -0.283 0.171 -1.66 0.098
COMP M1 RE const. 0.142 0.007 21.85 0.000 0.0035 0.0795
RDS 0.019 0.006 2.92 0.003
COMP M2 RE const. 0.144 0.006 22.44 0.000 0.0052 0.1376
RDS 0.019 0.006 2.94 0.003
MS -0.150 0.063 -2.40 0.016
Dependent variable: IR
 
Sample: 1974-2003. Source: Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Computations executed with Stata 
8. 
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Table A1  
Intensity of R&D expenditure by sector: time average 1980-1992          Level of technological opportunity by industry in the worlds largest firm
INDUSTRY R&D Product group Factor Rank Rank Rank %
HIGH Aerospace 18.9 R&D int. patent int. FG pat.
Computers 15.5 HIGH Instruments (photo&) 2.2 4 1 2
Pharmaceuticals 11.3 Computers 1.72 2 5 1
Electronics and telecoms 10.8 Pharmaceuticals 1.29 1 3 5
Other transport 8.1 Electrical-electronics 1.19 3 2 3
Instruments 7.2
MED-HIGH Chemicals 0.25 7 4 7
MED-HIGH Motor vehicles 4.4 Motor vehicles 0.18 6 10 4
Chemicals 2.8 Aircraft -0.04 5 7 12
Electrical Machinery 2.7
MEDIUM Rubber -0.4 8 9 10
MEDIUM Non-electrical machinery 1.7 Textiles -0.4 10 11 6
Other manufacturing 1.3 Machinery -0.44 9 6 15
Petroleum 1.3
Building materials 1.2 MED-LOW Building materials -0.56 11 8 13
Rubber and plastics 1.2 Paper and wood -0.67 15 15 8
Non-ferrous metals 0.8 Drink and tobacco -0.81 17 16 9
Metal products 0.6 Other transport -0.85 12 12 16
Ferrous metals 0.5 Food -0.87 14 17 11
Mining and petroleum -0.87 16 13 14
MED-LOW Paper and printing 0.3 Metals -0.92 13 14 17
Food and Tobacco 0.3
Wood and wood products 0.2 Source: Marsili (2001), Table 6.7
Textiles 0.2
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 3.1
source: Marsili (2001), Table 6.2  
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Table A2  Industrial classification based on R&D Intensity (source EC, 1996, Green Paper on Innovation)    
HIGH MEDIUM HIGH MEDIUM LOW LOW
SEMI CONDUCTORS AUTOMOBILES TRUCKER TRANSPORT SOFT DRINKS AND NON ALCH
AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT BUILDING MATERIALS TOBACCO
ELECTRONIC INSTRUMENTS CHEMICALS AND COAL TRANSPORT PAPER CONFECTIONERY
COMPOSITE OIL METAL AND GLASS CONFECT
PAPER FOREST PRODUCT
PUBLISHING FOREST PROD
BREWERS AND ALCOHOLICS
PUBLISHING NEWSPAPERS  
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Table A3: Model selection. Breush-Pagan and Hausman test results 
Sample Model Breush-Pagan Prob Hausman Prob Spec
W hole M1 4578.20 0.000 7.20 0.000 FE
W hole M2 3478.60 0.000 36.18 0.008 FE
TEX M1 226.90 0.000 0.75 0.386 RE
TEX M2 230.80 0.000 0.65 0.724 RE
AGR M1 64.79 0.000 1.83 0.176 RE
AGR M2 7.18 0.007 2.60 0.273 RE
BIO M1 410.03 0.000 4.06 0.091 RE
BIO M2 231.04 0.000 2.95 0.299 RE
PHA M1 1762.47 0.000 12.01 0.000 FE
PHA M2 472.62 0.000 23.69 0.000 FE
COMP M1 691.61 0.000 2.37 0.124 RE
COMP M2 870.98 0.000 5.74 0.057 RE
Group Means M2 20.59 0.000 3.54 0.171 RE
 
Note: “Group Means” indicates the sample obtained by averaging the firm-level data at the industry-level. 
Computations executed with Stata 8.  
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Table A4 Estimation results for the firm-level version of the CAPM 
Method: FGLS 
Dependent variable: R
(coeff) Variable Coefficient S td Error t-S tatistic Prob. Rbar-sq 
(alpha) d_TEX 0.097 0.005 19.02 0.000 0.84
(alpha) d_AGR 0.107 0.012 9.20 0.000
(alpha) d_BIO 0.136 0.003 40.43 0.000
(alpha) d_PHA 0.111 0.003 36.97 0.000
(alpha) d_CO M P 0.118 0.005 25.91 0.000
(beta) RSP500_TEX 0.850 0.116 7.33 0.000
(beta) RSP500_AG R 1.120 0.270 4.15 0.000
(beta) RSP500_BIO 1.542 0.065 23.62 0.000
(beta) RSP500_PH A 1.034 0.064 16.21 0.000
(beta) RSP500_CO M P 1.007 0.102 9.90 0.000
Value Prob.
W ald test of equality of the alpha coeffic ients 52.44 0.000
W ald test of unit beta coeffic ients 46.93 0.000
W ald test of unit beta coeffic ients excluding B IO 2.17 0.537
 
Sample: 1974-2003. Source: Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Computations executed with E-
views 4.0 
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Table A5 Results for the industry-level idiosyncratic risk regression. 
Method: RE-GLS
Dependent variable: IR
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob. R-sq within R-sq betw.
const. 0.088 0.0144 6.11 0.000 0.1876 0.1171
RDS 0.379 0.071 5.34 0.000
MS 1.511 0.936 1.61 0.114
 
Sample: 1974-2003. Source: Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Computations executed with Stata 8 
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Figure A1 Idiosyncratic risk and R&D intensity 1974-2003 (S&P500, agriculture, textiles, computers, 
pharmaceuticals,  and biotech) 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i Uncertainty in finance models appears through the analysis of the risk premia, i.e. the rewards that 
investors demand for bearing particular risks.  In the basic asset pricing equation below (Eq. 1) uncertainty is 
embodied in the variable M:  [ ]ttittit IXMEP |1,1 ++=  where Pit is the price of an asset i at time t (today); It is 
the conditional expectations operator conditioning on today’s information i,t+1; Xi,t+1 is the random payoff on 
asset i at time t+1 (tomorrow); and Mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor (SDF), i.e. a random variable whose 
realizations are always positive. The inclusion of uncertainty in asset pricing models occurs through the SDF.  
If there is no uncertainty, then M is simply a constant that converts expected payoffs tomorrow into value 
today (Campbell 2000). This is the same as when investors are risk neutral. If instead uncertainty is high, 
then the mapping between expected payoffs into today’s value is more complex. 
 
ii  “The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the former the 
distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either from calculation a priori or from statistics 
of past experience). While in the case of uncertainty that is not true, the reason being in general that it is 
impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a high degree unique…” 
(Knight, 1921, p. 232-233)     
iii The relation between the level of a firms’ stock price and stock price volatility has also been studied via the 
“leverage effect”: a firm’s stock price decline raises the firm’s financial leverage, resulting in an increase in 
the volatility of equity (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982).  The relation is also captured by studies of time-varying 
risk premia which argue that a forecasted increase in return volatility results in an increase in required 
expected future stock returns and thus an immediate stock price decline (Pindyk, 1984 and others reviewed 
in Duffie, 1995) 
iv They admit that this is a strong assumption but motivate it through the fact that a single shakeout is typical 
in the Gort and Klepper (1982) data and that particularly in the US tire industry there seems to have been 
one major invention, the Banbury mixer in 1916, which caused the shakeout to occur (Jovanovic and 
MacDonald, 1994, p. 324-325).  
 
v Jovanovic and Greenwood (1999) also link stock prices to innovation by developing a model in which 
innovation causes new capital to destroy old capital (with a lag). Since it is primarily incumbents who are 
initially quoted on the stock market, innovations cause the stock market to decline immediately since rational 
investors with perfect foresight foresee the future damage to old capital.  Hence the authors claim that the 
drop in market value of IT firms in the 1970’s was due to the upcoming IT revolution (in the 1990’s).  
 
vi In Mazzucato and Semmler (1999) and Mazzucato (2002), “excess volatility” is measured as in Shiller 
(1981), i.e. the difference between the standard deviation of actual stock prices (vt below) and efficient 
market prices (v*t):  *ttt vEv =    and  ∏∑
=
+
∞
=
+=
k
j
jt
k
ktt Dv
00
* γ   where *tv is the ex-post rational or perfect-
foresight price, ktD + is the dividend stream, jt+γ is a real discount factor equal to )1/(1 jtr ++ , and jtr + is the 
short (one-period) rate of discount at time t+j. 
vii The more idiosyncratic risk there is the more assets must be included to achieve diversification.  
viii For example, Lilien (1982) studies how increases in industry level volatility of productivity growth reduce 
output as resources are diverted from production to costly reallocation across sectors, and Cabballero and 
Hammour (1994) study “cleansing recessions” with reallocation of resources at the firm level.  Related are 
also models which test the firm-level relation between volatility and investment (Leahy and Whited, 1996).  
ix Evidence for (II) is found in the fact that the R sq. for the CAPM market model estimation have declined 
accordingly. 
 
x Idiosyncratic risk is defined as the ratio between the volatility of firm-level returns over the volatility of  
market level returns volatility. The volatility of returns is obtained employing firm-level monthly information for 
calculating the standard deviations at the annual frequency. 
 
xi The panel is unbalanced as firms are not always present in sample for the whole period 1974-2003. 
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xii Yet even for these low innovative industries, one must ask whether a longer time horizon would show that 
during the early evolution of these industries there was less correlation with the S&P500, as has been 
shown, for example, for the early evolution of automobiles in Mazzucato (2002). 
 
xiii Formally, 
( )
∑
∑
=
== N
t mttm
N
t ntm
mnNFEV
0
0
2
''
'
eΣAAe
TeAe
, where, N is the lead term (simulation horizon), A is the 
coefficient matrix for the MA representation of the VAR, T is a conformable triangular matrix such that 
'TTΣ = (Cholesky or triangular decomposition) and e is a selection vector for the shocks. 
xiv It is important to emphasize that this approach is not fully legitimate, given the perspective assumed here. 
First, because industry specificities may depend on factors that are loosely related to innovation, and the 
methodology cannot discriminate among them. Second, because quarterly observations are not the ideal 
reference time frequency upon which to base conclusive considerations on financial interrelations. 
 
xv If errors are contemporaneously uncorrelated, i.e. ( ) 0εε ='khE , for kh ≠ , or are contemporaneously  
correlated with ( ) 0Iεε ≠= hkkhE σ'  and kh XX =  for all kh, , there is no efficiency gain in employing a 
system estimation method (Zellner, 1962). Diversely, if errors are contemporaneously correlated and 
kh XX ≠  for some h  and k , there are efficiency gains by estimating equation 3 as a system. Note that, for 
the scopes of this analysis, the matrix X contains the sectional binary dummies and the rates of return of the 
SP500 (RETSP500). 
 
xvi The reference statistics is [ ]OLShhnhLR θθ ~ ~2 1 ll ∑ =−= , which is distributed as a 2χ  with ( ) 2/1−nn  
degrees of freedom. 
 
xvii The Wald statistics for this hypothesis is 1200.7. 
 
xviii The Wald statistics are equal to, respectively, 222.6 and 186.5. 
 
xix The industries considered in the analysis are (in order from least to most innovative according to R&D 
intensity figures): agriculture, textiles, pharmaceutical, computers and biotechnologies. 
 
xx We have already discussed in Section IV that the introduction of a variable accounting for the dimension of 
the firm is a reasonable choice, as the variability of returns depends also on the relative weight of the single 
firm respect to its sector, i.e. by its relative capitalization. 
 
xxi Some suggestive indications on the behaviour of the two variables over time can be found in the appendix. 
 
xxii The common coefficient model is a panel in which no fixed or random effects are employed as possible 
determinants of the cross-sectional variability. Results of this preliminary analysis can be obtained on 
request. 
 
xxiii In other terms, the error can be decomposed in a noisy i.i.d. ε  component and in a section-specific u  
component. 
 
xxiv The Breusch and Pagan (1980) LM statistic tests whether the variance of individual effects in the error 
term is zero, hence it actually maintains the RE model under the null hypothesis.  
 
xxv A detailed report of the specification selection tests is given in the appendix. 
 
xxvi It is interesting to signal that the statistical significance of the dimension factor is weakened in the FE 
specifications, signalling the presence of substantial correlation with the systematic individual effects 
dummies. 
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xxvii Gambardella’s (1995) analysis of the “random search” versus “guided search” phase of the 
pharmaceutical industry provides some insight into why there may be less uncertainty associated with high 
innovation. In what he calls the guided search phase of the pharma industry, dating more or less from the mid 
1980’s onwards, R&D intensity is high but  radical advances in enzymology, biotechnology and computational 
ability made the search process more “guided” resulting in more scale economies and path-dependency, and 
less uncertainty.  
 
